The case of stealing from a convert who subsequently dies and the money as well as the sacrifice is brought to the kohen. Cases are brought where the money and the sacrifice are brought to 2 different rotations of kohanim and what is done is discussed and argued depending on the situation. The asham brought after stealing is compared to the asham brought for meila – misuse of consecrated property. The tenth perek starts with a discussion of someone who eats the stolen item from the robber – can the owner demand the money back from the one who consumed it or only from the robber himself. It depends on whether or not the owner has given up on getting his item back or not. In the case where he gave up, the owner cannot demand it from the one who consumed it as the combination of the owner having given up and the change of ownership allows it to change ownership and therefor the original owner has no claim with the third party – he can only claim it from the robber. But if he had not given up, then the one who consumed is considered as if he stole it from the original owner as it was still in his possession at the time of consumption.
If one steals from a convert, lies about it and then admits he lied, but the convert dies and has no heirs, one must return the item to the kohanim who are working on that week’s rotation, mishmar. The gemara discusses a range of halachot that deal with when things have to go to the kohanim on that week’s mishmar and what are cases where it can be given to a different kohen. Since the returning of the item to the kohen is called by the Torah “an asham,” a word that is also used in general to mean the guilt offering, therefore Rava brings various halachot that treat this payment with the same criteria as the guilt offering for example, it can’t be paid at night just as sacrifices can’t be brought at night. The gemara ends with a discussion about whether the payment to the kohanim is viewed as inheritance (they are in place of the convert’s inheritors) or as a gift and the ramifications are mentioned. The gemara concludes that is it viewed as a gift.
There is a three-way argument regarding the relationship between shlichut yad (where the shomer used the item he was watching) to the case where the shomer claims the item was stolen. If the shomer used the item and then claimed it was stolen, is he obligated in the double payment or do we say that first he was obligated for shlichut yad in which case he acquires the object and is now responsible even for accidental damage or do we say that the obligation for stealing is only in a case where there is shlichut yad. Or possibly both are options. Various questions are brought (some are answered some are not) regarding the mechanisms by which one may be obligated only in the double payment and the one fifth payment is cancelled out by it. If a shomer chinam opts to not swear that an item was stolen and pays for it, he gains the rights to the double payment in the event that the robber is caught. But there is disagreement regarding a case where he swore and then paid. Other questions are raised about who is responsible for finding the robber in the event that the shomer paid. Various ramifications are brought.
Rava’s explanation of Rav’s opinion (regarding one who takes an oath regarding a pikadon and then witnesses come, he is no longer obligated to pay the owner), is questioned from Ravi Mamnuna’s understanding of Rav. But Rav Hamnuna’s understanding is reinterpreted in a way that fits in with Rava’s expalnation. 3 halachot are brought by Rabbi Yochanan regarding the responsibilities of one who falsely claims that the pikadon was stolen. Questions on his opinions and opposing opinions are brought. Issues related to – is there an obligation of 4 or 5 times the payment if he slaughtered and sold the object, does double payment also apply if he claimed the item was lost, and is he obligated in a double payment only in a case where the admitted to owing part of the claim and denied part of the claim or also when he denied the entire claim?
Rav Sheshet holds that once one denies a claim regarding an item he was watching, he becomes a robber and is obligated to pay even for accidental damages. Others question his opinion and counter that the change from shomer to robber happens only once he swears falsely. Various sources are brought to question Rav Sheshet but are resolved. Rav learns from the verse “the owner takes and he doesn’t need to pay” that once one swears, even if witnesses come and prove that he was lying, he will no longer need to pay. Various sources are brought to question Rav. As a result of one question on Rav, Rava reinterprets Rav’s statement and limits it to a case where the shomer claimed it was lost, and then swore. He did not admit he was lying but witnesses came and proved he was lying. In that case he does not need to pay. But in any case where he came forward and admitted or in a case where he claimed it was stolen and then witneses came, he would be obligated to pay (as the verses in the Torah clearly state that).
The gemara establishes from the mishna and a braita that heirs need to pay the 1/5 that their fathers owe. The gemara then brings a braita which implies that they don’t. 2 answers are given to explain in which cases they do and in which they don’t. Since the mishna establishes that the obligation to return the item directly to its owner only applies when the item owed is more than a pruta. Rava questions a number of cases in which the value was a pruta and now went down in value or the stolen items we all together a pruta but half was returned. Rava also asks about chametz that was stolen before Pesach and at the time the robber swore falsely, it was already after Pesach and the item no longer had value. Do the laws of swearing falsely for theft apply since the chametz has potential value since in the event it gets stolen, the owner needs to pay back the value from when it was stolen or do they not because at this moment, the item exists and it has no value since it is forbidden to benefit from chametz that was around on Pesach. Raba thought there was an obvious answer that one is obligated because of the financial potential. Rav Amram questions his answer from a braita and Raba answers it up saying that his opinion and the braita are referring to different circumstances.
The mishna assumes that one who swears falsely is the one who needs to ensure that he gets what he stole directly to the one who he stole from. But that if he stole but didn’t swear about it, it would be sufficient to send in the hands of a messenger. The gemara questions how this fits in or doesn’t with an argument Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva have regarding one who stole and five people claim he stole from them and he doesn’t know which one is the one he stole from. Three different answers are brought. The gemara then discusses an argument between Rav Hisda and Rabba about a case where one sent a messenger to receive his loan payment (for example) and appointed the messenger in front of witnesses, would this mean that the messenger is receiving it on his behalf and the borrower is no longer responsible if something happens to the money on the way or is the messenger just there to make it easier for the borrower to get the money back to the original owner but is not in fact assuming responsibility. and if the item gets lost/stolen on the way the borrower would need to repay the loan. The nature of the payment of the one fifth is discussed – is it a gift to the one who was robbed in order to effect atonement for the robber or is it a financial payment? Ramifications are also brought.
An opinion of the people in Israel is brought that claims that if a middleman changes from what the buyer wants, the buyer cannot acquire the item because the seller had no intent to give rights to the buyer – his intent was on the middleman. A braita is brought to contradict that claim – however it is explained that the issue in the braita was not the same. A case with Rav was brought to support their opinion but then it was explained that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. The ishna discusses an asham gezeila – in a case where someone steals and swears that he didn’t and later regrets it and admits that he lied, he must make sure to return the item to the original owner, even if it means it will cost him money to travel to find the owner.
The gemara asks whether the value of wool that is dyed is considered like it is wool with dye in it or do we say that since the dye isn’t tangible, we don’t view it as being made up of dye and wool. The gemara then proceeds to explain in what case there is relevance to the question. A number of attempts are rejected and then a number of cases are brought in which the question is relevant. They attempt to answer the question by bringing in sources relating to dyeing using shmita and orla produce, but in the end these proofs are rejected. Rava then raises a contradiction of the orla case and a tumah case and it is resolved. And in a tangent, Rava brings two contradictory sources relating to whether or not kedushat shviit (shmita) applies to tree not used to eating. That contradiction is also resolved.
Shmuel teaches that if a slaughterer messes up and treifs up the animal, he is responsible whether or not he did it for free or for pay. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and distinguishes between one who gets paid and one who does it for free. He compares it to laws of shomrim and just as one who gets paid to watch an item assumes more responsibility in the event of theft or loss, likewise by the slaughterer or any professional. However if they are not getting paid, they are like a shomer who watches the item for free who is not obligated in a case of theft or loss. Is a professional damaging an item more similar to laws of shomrim because the item was given to him by the owner? Or is it more like adam hamazik – a person who damages another’s item, in which case he is obligated even for unintentional damage (ones). Cases relating to a money changer are brought – where one rules on the validity of a coin and causes a loss. If he is a real professional, then he is not responsible if he gave the advice for free, however Rabbi Chiya ruled for himself beyonf the letter of the law and reimbursed a woman for her loss based on his ruling. A case ensues with Rabbi Elazar and Reish Lakish and the commentaries differ on whether Rabbi Elazar was an expert or not, thereby affecting the conclusion one can assume from that case. The mishna discusses more cases where the dyer did something different from what he was meant to do and there are 2 different cases and different opinions about what the halacha is in one of them.