Statements (and different versions of those statements) are brought regarding the similarities and differences between the different types of sin offerings – are they considered the same type for laws regarding intent or not? The is a debate regarding one who slaughters the animal with the intent that the blood be sprinkled for a different sacrifice. In a sin offering, would disqualify the sacrifice or not? Do we learn from laws of pigul or not? A proof is brought for each side of the debate. Rabbi Eliezer holds that a guilt (asham) offering is also disqualified like a sin offering if it is brought with the wrong intent. He brings several proofs for his position as some of them are knocked out by Rabbi Yehoshua.
A Pesach slaughtered not in its proper time with the intent for some other offering gets sacrificed as a shlamim (peace) offering (regardless of what actual type of sacrifice the intent was for). Fromwhere is this halacha derived? A statement of Mavog is brought regarding a sin offering brought with other intentions but it is not clear what intentions he is referring to and what his psak is.
There is a debate regarding a Toda that is sacrificed for someone else who needs to bring a Toda offering. Rava brings a number of halachot regarding problems with intentions during the sacrifical rites. From where is the halacha derived that a Pesach sacrifice that is done with the intention of being a different type of sacrifice or for the wrong people it is entirely disqualified (like the sin offering)?
The gemara continues the question regarding the sacrifice that is no longer good because it was done with the wrong intent and yet still gets sacrificed. Can a burnt offering provide atonement for positive commandments one did not fulfill between the time the animal was designated to be sacrificed until the time it was slaughtered or only for those before the animal was designated?
Further discussions about where we derive the laws regarding sacrifices that are brought with the wrong intentions that they are sacrificed but as voluntary offerings and do not provide atonement for the original intent and a new sacrifice has to be brought.
What is the source for the disqualification of the sacrifice in the case where it was sacrificed for the wrong type of sacrifice or for the wrong person – in each of the 4 sacrificial rites?
Several contradictions are raised against statements brought in the name of Rav relating to cases in which sacrifices are/are not disqualified. Comparisons are made to divorce documents, impurities in utensils (what things are considered a barrier that the impurity cannot pass through), and laws within the topic itself (various different cases where thoughts disqualify/don’t disqualify the sacrifices).
What happens if one of the main parts of the sacrificial rites is performed with the wrong intent? What if it was done with no particular intent – is that considered “no intent” or “intent”? How does this compare to a get (divorce document) that requires it be written “leshma” – for the particular woman getting divorced?
Horayot ends with a series of lists of precedence – what sacrifices take precedence over others? Which people take precedence over others? What is the best type of leader to head the Beit Midrash? Interestingly enough, the last question of the masachet is answered with a teiku – no answer is given!
What are the differences between different types of Kohanim?